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Abstract 
 
Learning among actors within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) negotiations helped transferring climate policies across countries 
and changed negotiation positions. Together with group pressure and leadership by key 
governments and non-national actors, experience, knowledge and belief-based learning 
types altered the UNFCCC negotiation dynamics and facilitated the Paris Agreement. 
Governments, the UNFCCC secretariat and NGOs created opportunities for govern-
ment representatives to explore policy options and learn from each other’ successes of 
designing and implementing low carbon policies. These experience exchanges during 
and beyond the UNFCCC meetings were established to help countries share their expe-
riences with low carbon economic development plans to address climate change while 
decoupling economic growth. Based on elite interviews, participant observation and 
document analysis, this contribution examines how learning facilitated breakthroughs 
in international climate negotiations. It finds that structured experience exchange of 
and reflection on other countries’ and non-national actors’ successful policy experienc-
es can modify national interests as policymakers increasingly understand that climate 
action can support economic growth. This resulted in a higher willingness to take on 
more ambitious climate action commitments. Sharing experiences with climate policies 
can facilitate other actor’s learning how they can adapt successful policies to their spe-
cific framework conditions. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
Addressing global environmental challenges requires cooperation among national gov-
ernments and non-national actors that find themselves interdependent of each other 
(Biermann, 2014; Ostrom, 2010). However, intergovernmental negotiations frequently 
struggle to achieve breakthroughs due to incompatible national interests, asymmetric 
power relationships, poor negotiation management (Monheim, 2014) and domestic bar-
riers (Daugbjerg & Swinbank, 2016). Learning is understood as a positive means to 
identify compromise solutions and facilitate policy change (Bernstein & Cashore, 
2012), while it can also be distorted by distrust, self-serving assessments of fairness, 
information asymmetries and over-confidence (e.g. Odell, 2009; Thompson, 2001). 
Learning is widely regarded as important factor that can influence policy change most-
ly on the sub-national (Bellinson & Chu, 2018), national (McNutt & Rayner, 2018) and 
regional (e.g. European Union) policymaking levels (Dunlop & Radaelli, 2016; Feindt, 
2010). It also matters for transnational city networks such as C40 (Lee, 2018). There 
are however limited insights on the role of learning on the international level. For ex-
ample, Haas and Haas (1995) and Nye (1987) point out that learning somehow matters 
in global governance, but we lack a clear understanding of how learning can facilitate 
international agreements addressing particularly wicked cross-border problems of the 
21st century. Gaps remain in the literature to better understand learning as a potentially 
facilitating factor towards achieving breakthroughs in international (environmental) 
negotiations. Addressing these gaps is highly significant as learning can subsequently 
used more strategically to resolve negotiation deadlocks. 
The empirical analysis focuses on climate change as problem that is particularly 
difficult to address due to its cross-border nature and complexity (Ostrom, 2010). Until 
the 2015 Paris Agreement, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) negotiations were deadlocked for over 20 years due to incompati-
ble national interests (Gupta, 2012; Keohane & Victor, 2010) while the objective of 
avoiding dangerous climate change was slowly drifting out of reach (IPCC, 2014; Ja-
cobs, 2012). Additional efforts to those pledged in the Nationally Determined Contri-
butions NDCs (Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2017) are still required. Nevertheless, na-
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tional governments and non-national actors alike regarded the adoption of the Paris 
Agreement on Climate Change in December 2015 as a major breakthrough (Falkner, 
2016; Jacobs, 2016). It concluded a decades-long period of deadlocked international 
negotiations about no less than sustained economic development and prosperity in the 
21st century, while also averting and adapting to the unavoidable consequences of cli-
mate change. The Paris Agreement was made possible by a number of factors. These 
include the concerted effort of both national governments and non-national actors in 
the form of pioneering climate mitigation and adaptation policies on the national and 
sub-national level (Nachmany et al. 2014), global public pressure, a bottom-up process 
of INDCs and public commitments, skillful process management by the French presi-
dency and the UNFCCC secretariat as well as falling costs of low carbon technologies, 
regulatory leadership on the national and sub-national level and the development of a 
climate finance architecture compensating and supporting developing countries to pur-
sue low carbon economic development pathways (Falkner, 2016; Figueres, 2015; 
Ivanova, 2016; Oberthür, 2016). 
To better understand how learning can facilitate breakthroughs in international 
negotiations, this contribution further develops a theoretical framework (Rietig & Per-
kins, 2018) from the European Public Policy literature to analyze decision-making in 
international negotiations. The learning framework is based on key theoretical perspec-
tives situated at the intersection of public policy and international relations within insti-
tutionalism and constructivism (e.g. Argyris & Schön, 1978; Haas & Haas, 1995; 
March & Olsen, 1975; Nye, 1987; Sabatier, 1987). It emphasizes that individuals and 
organizations need to reflect on any new information or experiences by actively think-
ing about these inputs and considering how they match with their pre-existing under-
standing of an issue. Only if individuals and/ or organizations reflect on such new in-
formation or experiences, learning can occur. The framework differentiates three basic 
types of learning across the individual and organizational levels (Rietig & Perkins, 
2018). Previous studies on learning focused in their conception of learning on the act 
of acquiring information and experience (e.g. Dunlop & Radaelli, 2016; Haas & Haas, 
1995). Yet it is precisely the aspects of reflection and behavioral change that are neces-
sary for policy change to occur. Early work on learning (e.g. Argyris & Schön, 1978; 
March & Olsen, 1975) places considerable emphasis on the essentially reflexive nature 
of learning, treating learning as an active process of change. Learning can be a relevant 
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factor in arriving at policy outcomes (Bernstein & Cashore, 2012), which can also in-
teract with other factors such as the institutional machinery, political interests, bargain-
ing and coercive power (Janis & Mann, 1977). 
The central research question is ‘How can learning among national and non-
national actors involved in international climate governance be identified and if pre-
sent, to what extent did it alter government’s negotiation positions to facilitate the ne-
gotiations resulting in the 2015 Paris Agreement? The key contribution of this article is 
to advance our understanding of the role learning can play in overcoming deadlocks in 
intergovernmental negotiations. There is a gap in the learning literature on whether and 
how learning can contribute to achieve breakthroughs in negotiations, i.e. contribute to 
more effective global governance. This is not only relevant for climate change, but 
could also be applied to other difficult negotiations on challenges of the 21st century.  
The article proceeds in four parts. The next section will briefly analyze the 
learning literature and present a learning framework applicable to identify and evaluate 
learning in international negotiations. Following the methodology section, the empiri-
cal section will apply the learning framework to the UNFCCC negotiations leading up 
to the 2015 Paris Agreement. The discussion and conclusion section will reflect on the 
analytical strength of the learning framework to understand learning as a key factor 
that facilitated arriving at a ‘common landing zone’ for the Paris Agreement.  
 
 
LEARNING IN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS  
 
Learning is widely understood in the International Relations and Public Policy litera-
ture as updating of beliefs, acquisition of skills and knowledge, acting upon experienc-
es or detecting and correcting errors (Dunlop & Radaelli, 2013; Zito & Schout, 2009), 
usually resulting in modified behavior. We can differentiate between learning among 
the individual negotiator or policymaker (Dunlop, 2009) and a number of individuals 
that are involved in a collective process of e.g. gaining new knowledge through trial 
and error or assessing and disseminating this new knowledge. Actors can also benefit 
from collective products of learning, which can include rules, strategies or shared ideas 
(Gerlak & Heikkila, 2011, 623; Heikkila & Gerlak, 2013).  
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The learning literature spans over five decades and across a number of disci-
plines and sub-disciplines including management studies, social psychology, educa-
tion, International Relations and Public Policy. A partly overlapping and increasingly 
differentiated typology of learning emerged and was discussed, reviewed and applied 
predominantly in the Public Policy literature with inspiration also drawn from the Or-
ganizational Studies literature. These learning types include among others social learn-
ing, organizational learning, governance learning, policy learning, political learning 
and policy-oriented learning (e.g. Bennett & Howlett, 1992; Hall, 1993; Kemp & 
Weehuizen, 2005; Radaelli & Dunlop, 2013; Zito & Schout 2009). The Public Policy 
literature points towards the relevance of a ‘policy broker’ or ‘policy entrepreneur’ to 
initiate learning processes and facilitate policy change (Howlett et al., 2017; Mintrom, 
2013; Sabatier, 1988). We can identify a number of milestone contributions for under-
standing the influence of learning on negotiations and policy change that served as ef-
fective basis for analyzing learning over the previous decades. The conceptualization 
of learning used in this analysis is based on March and Olsen’s (1975) illustration of 
the link between learning of individuals and the transfer or learning to the level of the 
organization, Argyris and Schön’s (1978) explanation of learning as detecting and 
eliminating errors as single-/double loop learning and on Janis and Mann’s (1977) em-
phasis on non-learning, i.e. the inability or a conscious decision not to engage with a 
new input. Learning can play an important role in modifying national interests and in-
fluencing international regimes (Nye, 1987), while actors can alter their behavior and 
strategies to progress towards the adjusted national interest as a result of their learning 
(Haas, 1980).  
To be able to assess whether learning occurred in a negotiation process and to 
what extent it influenced the negotiation outcome, either by facilitating or obstructing 
agreement among negotiation parties, it is essential to adopt an understanding of learn-
ing that requires reflection of the learner as a conscious cognitive process. The frame-
work presented in this contribution is a meta-theoretical framework that draws on the 
Public Policy, Organizational Studies and International Relations literature. A key 
condition for learning to occur is that individuals and/ or organizations reflect on an 
input such as new information or an experience by carefully thinking about how this 
input matches with their pre-existing beliefs, e.g. their world view and understanding 
of an issue. To reflect on an input, the learner needs to be cognitively aware of the in-
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put and actively deliberate it. This reflection is a pre-condition for learning to occur. If 
there is no reflection, learning does not occur (Rietig & Perkins, 2018).  
We can differentiate between three basic archetypes of learning that consolidate 
the various overlapping classifications of learning that emerged from the Public Policy, 
International Relations and Organizational Studies literatures. Following a reflection 
on knowledge, factual learning occurs. If an individual or organization reflects on pre-
vious experience, experiential learning occurs. If the individual and/ or organization 
subsequently also changed underlying beliefs, they engaged in constructivist learning 
(Rietig & Perkins, 2018).  
Individuals and organizations frequently engage in factual learning when they 
receive new information or when they rearrange previous knowledge once they find 
themselves in a different context (Radaelli, 1995). They reflect on the input while they 
are cognitively processing the new information and increase their existing knowledge 
base (Argyris & Schön, 1978). In a negotiation context, actors for example learn about 
technical details of the negotiation topic, underlying international law such as the con-
tent of previous agreements, negotiation positions of their own and other countries as 
well as how compatible positions are in terms of negotiation margins and ‘red lines’. 
The information sources for factual learning are usually scientific studies, policy briefs, 
media articles (including negotiation-specific news outlets such as the Earth Negotia-
tions Bulletin providing summaries of on-going negotiations), submissions of other ne-
gotiation parties to the UN and their related bodies, as well as position papers by out-
side actors and non-state actor stakeholders. Factual learning can also result from ver-
bal or written accounts of other actor’s experiences. 
Experiential learning is the most frequent type of learning in negotiation pro-
cesses and occurs once actors reflect on their previous experience in similar situations, 
draw conclusions on their or other actor’s behavior and transfer this experience to the 
current situation to devise a strategy of how to negotiate, present information or form 
coalitions. It refers to ‘how’ actors behave in negotiations based on their previous ex-
perience, practice of becoming skilful negotiators and reflection on which negotiation 
tactics worked in similar past situations or resulted in negotiation deadlocks/ break-
downs. Experiential learning is the most frequent form of learning observed in the lit-
erature across different levels of governance and has been awarded different labels in-
cluding political learning (May, 1992), policy-oriented learning (Sabatier, 1987), learn-
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ing-by-doing and single-/double loop learning that detects and corrects behavioral er-
rors (Argyris & Schön, 1978; Dunlop, 2009) as well as learning how to better engage 
in lip-service to manipulate negotiation partners (Koch & Lindenthal, 2011).  
As a consequence of factual or experiential learning, actors can change their 
underlying beliefs about how they see an issue, for example on nuclear weapons or en-
vironmental protection (Nye, 1987; Haas & Haas, 1995), which means that they en-
gage in constructivist learning. Beliefs refer to how a person or organization views the 
world. They include a normative understanding of how the world, and by extension, 
negotiation outcomes and implementing policies ‘ought’ to be. They are directly linked 
to the national interest, i.e. a country’s belief of what they want to achieve in negotia-
tions that best matches with the country’s normative understanding of which negotia-
tion outcomes would be beneficial to its’ citizens. The following table summarizes the 
theoretical framework on learning. 
 
 Factual learning      Experiential learning    Constructivist  
learning  
Indi-
vidual 
level  
Individual actors have 
acquired (e.g. from stud-
ies) and reflected on 
new information; in-
creased knowledge and 
expertise deployed by 
actors in their task envi-
ronment. 
Active engagement with 
particular issue through 
direct experience and re-
flecting on successes and 
failures to enhance actors’ 
existing political or bu-
reaucratic practices and 
competencies. 
Changed personal norms, 
values or policy beliefs; 
underpins new and/or re-
inforced personal com-
mitments and actions. 
Organi-
zational 
level  
 
New knowledge is ac-
quired by and transmit-
ted through an organiza-
tion; reflection, incorpo-
ration and use of 
knowledge in organiza-
tional activities and/or 
to inform organizational 
position. 
Critical reflection on ex-
isting practices and per-
formances within context 
of existing organizational 
goals; the accompanying 
development and/or re-
finement of new organiza-
tional processes, strate-
gies and behaviors.  
Change in organizational 
beliefs and values over 
time; institutionalization 
of normative beliefs, the 
reframing of organiza-
tional goals and discon-
tinuous organizational ac-
tion. 
Table 1. Criteria for identifying learning in the policy process. Source: Rietig & Per-
kins, 2018: 493. 
 
Although learning is an important intervening factor for policy change and ne-
gotiation outcomes, it is not the only explanation and needs to be analyzed in conjunc-
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tion with other factors such as defensive avoidance (Janis & Mann, 1977), the institu-
tional machinery, voting majorities or the power of policy entrepreneurs (Mintrom, 
2013). It is possible for negotiation outcomes to occur without learning processes, i.e. 
if there is no reflection on the input, the input does not result in additional knowledge 
or experience, or if the actor does not form or adjust related beliefs. Actors may simply 
not reflect on an input due to time constraints, lack of other resources, following orders 
or an unwillingness to engage with the issue, which means that they enter a state of de-
fensive avoidance (Janis & Mann, 1977; Rietig, 2018). Conventional negotiation tac-
tics include making strategic use of power asymmetries such as agreeing deals behind 
the scenes, venue shopping, forming coalitions to secure a blocking minority or voting 
majority. They furthermore include making use of procedural tactics, offering side-
payments and suggesting a quid-pro-quo on other negotiation topics or policy areas 
outside the immediate negotiations (Elgström & Jönsson, 2000; Tallberg, 2006; 
Warntjen, 2008). This literature points towards the relevance of ‘gains’ from participa-
tion in negotiations and voting power within international institutions and thus ulti-
mately the importance of parties’ ability to protect national interests. Behind-closed-
door deals and small groups taking leadership roles can result in low effectiveness and 
failing to win the support of all actors necessary to arrive at a shared decision (Mon-
heim, 2014).  
Policy entrepreneurs are crucial agents that can facilitate or hinder learning by 
others. They are very dedicated individuals in central decision-making positions with 
access to the negotiations, frequently in central leadership roles (Braun, 2009; Min-
trom, 2013; Mintrom & Norman, 2009). Frequently they have learned from their own 
or other’s failures and successes in previous negotiations. They could e.g. have reflect-
ed on the experience (including positives and errors), and devised strategies how they 
can take better control of the decision-making process via various policy entrepreneur-
ial strategies. They can also facilitate the learning of other actors by allowing them to 
engage in the process as well as encouraging them to reflect on the experience and new 
knowledge. Subsequently, there are two ways how learning can be transferred into the 
negotiation outcome. Policy entrepreneurs, who have learned in the past, either use 
conventional bargaining strategies and negotiation tactics to push their proposal 
through the decision-making process (i.e. via power asymmetries) or they act as teach-
ers (Bomberg, 2007; McNutt & Rayner, 2018). As teachers they choose to engage with 
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other actors, explain to them why their policy proposal is in the other actor’s interest 
and convince them to support the proposal. The advantage of the ‘teaching’ approach 
is that it may result in self-reinforcing dynamics when the negotiation partners reflect 
on the input by the policy entrepreneurial teachers and subsequently change their be-
liefs (Rietig & Perkins, 2018). This may in turn enable the learners to become teachers 
and thus agents of policy change in subsequent negotiations. 
The following sections use the above theoretical framework, which places the 
pre-requisite of ‘reflection’ by the individual and organizational learning agent at the 
heart of its analysis, to determine to what extent learning facilitated the breakthrough 
in the 2015 climate change negotiations resulting in the Paris Agreement. 
 
 
Methodology 
To determine whether learning did indeed take place, the learning literature concluded 
that an observation time frame of about a decade is appropriate (Radaelli, 2009). 
Therefore, the analysis covers the years between 2005 and 2015, from the entering into 
force of the Kyoto Protocol to the adoption of the Paris Agreement. The Paris Agree-
ment makes for an interesting and relevant test case of learning as it results from a dec-
ade-long negotiation process involving various political interests. The research triangu-
lates findings from document analysis, participant observation and elite interviews. 
The key data source is elite interviews with government representatives and non-
national actors involved the negotiations leading up to the Paris Agreement as elite in-
terviews and subsequent process-tracing (Hall, 2013) have proven to be the most ap-
propriate methods for studying learning, leadership and the involvement of non-
national actors (Bernstein & Cashore, 2012; Betsill & Corell, 2008; Monheim, 2014). 
The author carried out 15 elite interviews between 2013 and 2018. Interviewees in-
cluded 3 members of the UNFCCC secretariat, 2 chairs of committees, 8 key negotia-
tors as well as 2 non-national actors who closely observed and influenced the negotia-
tions. To control for bias in the interviews, the author analyzed various documents in-
cluding negotiation texts, position papers, records of speeches and Earth Negotiations 
Bulletin publications 2008-2015 (UNFCCC, 2009-15). To better understand the nego-
tiation dynamics and triangulate/ confirm the primary interview and document data, the 
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author also attended the UNFCCC negotiations for a total of 7 weeks in 11/2009 (Bar-
celona), 12/2009 (Copenhagen), 6/2011 (Bonn), 5/2013 (Bonn) and 12/2015 (Paris) to 
observe negotiation sessions and ‘side event’ panels on various negotiation-related top-
ics and took detailed notes of these sessions, which were analyzed with the interviews 
and documents.  
The baseline for learning on the individual level is the previous experience and 
expertise the individual had at the outset of engaging with the new legislative proposal. 
Learning can be measured as a change in the status quo, the difference between the 
point in time when the individual began to engage with a topic discussed in the UN-
FCCC negotiations and the adoption of the Paris Agreement as the final step. Reflec-
tion requires time (Radaelli, 2009) and a certain autonomy from hierarchical pressures 
(Janis & Mann, 1977). To identify learning on the individual level, the accounts of ac-
tors about their involvement in the negotiation process would need to show that they 
reflected on the input in the form of additional knowledge or experience with negotia-
tions and/or (sub-) national policies compared to the ‘baseline’ of their pre-existing 
knowledge/ experience before being involved in the negotiation or (sub-) national poli-
cymaking process (Rietig & Perkins, 2018).  
 Learning occurred if individuals and/or organizations gained knowledge in 
terms of a better understanding of negotiation topics or policies on the national or sub-
national level (factual learning), or increased experience by being involved in the draft-
ing and/or negotiation process and gaining experience in applying negotiation strate-
gies (experiential learning). Reflection on such factual or experiential learning can po-
tentially result in constructivist learning via changed underlying beliefs (Haas and 
Haas, 1995; Nye, 1987; Sabatier, 1988). Learning can be transferred from the individ-
ual to the organizational level if the organization (e.g. government department, NGO) 
also reflects on the additional knowledge and/or experience, and possibly changes its 
beliefs. This is crucial for learning to be reflected in the negotiation outcome as such 
decisions are made on behalf of organizations. Policy entrepreneurs play a key role to 
translate learning on the individual level into learning on the organizational level (i.e. 
once someone speaks ‘on behalf’ of a government/ country or organization, or official 
position papers/ policy statements).  
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LEARNING IN THE UNFCCC NEGOTIATIONS LEADING UP TO THE PAR-
IS AGREEMENT 
 
Factual learning in the UNFCCC negotiations  
 
There is a certain inherent fluctuation of individuals involved in the UNFCCC negotia-
tions on behalf of their countries’ government or via non-national actors. Negotiators 
on the diplomat level frequently work for their government’s ministry of the environ-
ment, climate change, energy, foreign affairs or increasingly finance/economic affairs 
and tend to remain in their roles for a longer time frame of over 5 years and are there-
fore also more likely to participate in several UNFCCC negotiations. Some participat-
ed in the UNFCCC negotiations or worked on climate change related topics for over 
ten years as a comparison of the UNFCCC participation lists over a decade illustrates 
(UNFCCC 2005-2015), while others entered the climate negotiations and gained new 
knowledge about climate-related topics through job rotations as civil servants or career 
changes (Interview 1, 2, 12). It is important to differentiate between those groups when 
analyzing learning as the level of pre-existing knowledge on climate change and tech-
nical topics matters. The level of specialization is usually high given complex topics 
such as emissions trading, measuring, reporting and verification of greenhouse gas 
emissions, reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. If the indi-
vidual is already an expert in any of those areas, they are more likely to act as ‘teach-
ers’ (Bomberg, 2007) by offering their expertise to other negotiators and explaining 
technical details when the need arises. They are less likely to gain a significant amount 
of new knowledge from participating in the negotiations; thereby their learning can be 
rather classified as incremental. They also participate in ‘side events’ by organizing 
and contributing to panels on dedicated topics that aim at disseminating information 
about e.g. the latest climate science or governance research findings and offer a forum 
to discuss questions in a non-negotiation setting that encourages a more open exchange 
of ideas and knowledge than in the formal negotiations. Actors who only began to at-
tend UNFCCC negotiations relatively recently experienced a steep learning curve with 
regards to being presented with and reflecting on an overwhelming wealth of 
knowledge about the different sub-topics of the climate negotiations and especially the 
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area they are specializing in such as climate finance, technology transfer or the finer 
points of measuring, reporting and verifying greenhouse gas emissions (Interview 5, 9, 
10, 12, 14). 
It is to a certain extent unavoidable for individuals involved in the negotiations 
to engage in factual learning by reflecting on new knowledge provided by e.g. the 
Earth Negotiations Bulletin, the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) or in workshops focused on exchanging experiences with national cli-
mate policies. Government representatives filter the information they receive through 
the lens of their national interests and compare how they fit with the existing negotia-
tion position (Weible, 2008). If the new information matches with the pre-existing ne-
gotiation position, they engage in a political use of the knowledge to underpin their ar-
guments and try to convince other negotiators with scientific studies of the viability of 
their proposals (Interview 2, 5). If however the information does not match their nego-
tiation position, they either enter a state of defensive avoidance by ignoring the input 
or, as long as the new information is compatible with the underlying beliefs of their 
government or negotiation coalition, they reflect on the new input and may arrive at the 
conclusion that their negotiation position needs to be changed to reflect the new 
knowledge. 
For the UNFCCC negotiations, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) provides the main input regarding the latest evidence on climate 
change via its Assessment Reports. The 4th Assessment Report (IPCC, 2007) had a ma-
jor effect on individual negotiators to reflect on the input, learn about the exacerbating 
effects of climate change and to acknowledge in the face of the overwhelming scien-
tific evidence provided by the IPCC that the climate crisis exists and that it requires a 
global response (Interview 5, 8, 13, 14). This consensus was maintained among UN-
FCCC negotiators also in the light of ‘climate gate’ and rising levels of climate skepti-
cism fuelled by attempts of the fossil fuel industry and closely linked government offi-
cials to dispute the scientific consensus. The 5th Assessment Report of the IPCC (2014) 
resulted in an updating of individual negotiator’s knowledge in terms of recognizing 
that the climatic changes communicated by the 4th Assessment Report were progress-
ing faster with more intensive weather impacts (Interview 13, 14). 
 The second major learning process among individual negotiators occurred be-
tween 2010 and 2015, when certain countries assumed leadership positions in the cli-
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mate negotiations by setting up domestic climate change policies covering mitigation 
and adaptation efforts and began to present their achievements within the UNFCCC 
negotiations. This took initially the form of roundtable discussions and side events be-
tween 2010 and 2013, until a significant part of the 2013 May UN climate talks in 
Bonn was dedicated to countries presenting their low carbon economic development 
plans and domestic climate change legislation. In this time frame an increasing number 
of developed and developing countries began to set up ambitious climate policies 
(Nachmany et al., 2014). These policies were further enhanced by a multitude of non-
state actors such as regions, cities, businesses and investors setting up initiatives for 
decarbonization and divestment from fossil fuel investments, resulting in strong ‘bot-
tom-up’ action through national-level policies (Falkner, 2016). This wealth of infor-
mation allowed lead negotiators usually fully emerged in the core negotiations to also 
update their knowledge on other countries’ climate policies and reflect on information 
regarding how climate policies can be designed in similar national contexts. They be-
gan drawing lessons from other actors’ experiences on the challenges and opportunities 
of such policies with regards to decoupling economic growth from carbon emissions 
via investments into renewable energies and energy efficiency (Interview 3, 5, 9, 12, 
13). 
The factual learning that occurred among individual negotiators both about 
climate science as well as options for low carbon economic development and climate 
policies was transferred to the organizational level of national governments and non-
national actors once the individuals convinced their central decision-makers or were in 
a position themselves to adopt a negotiation position that reflected the learning among 
actors on the individual level. This was evidenced by speeches and statements given on 
behalf of national governments and multinational negotiation groups in recognition of 
the scientific findings of the IPCC reports and by requests for more information regard-
ing the effectiveness of other countries’ climate policies (Interview 2, 3, 6, 10) as well 
as calls for assistance to develop their own climate policies in the form of INDCs (In-
tended National Contributions) in response to the Paris Agreement (Interview 1, 2, 7, 
11). 
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Experiential learning 
 
Learning based on experiences requires individuals and/or organizations to reflect on 
their previous experiences and to either confirm their course of action based on the 
previous experiences or to modify it. Individuals usually engage in experiential learn-
ing by being involved in the UNFCCC negotiations. They gain new experience regard-
ing the decision-making process within their governmental or non-governmental dele-
gation and negotiation bloc as well as modify their negotiation strategies and tactics 
based on their experiences of what helps them to achieve their objectives – and what is 
rather a hindrance (Interviews 1, 3, 4, 9, 12). As learning is measured from the baseline 
of pre-existing experience, new entrants to the negotiations experience a steeper learn-
ing curve than ‘veteran’ negotiators who have several years of negotiation experience 
within the UNFCCC and/or related negotiations. Experienced negotiators also possess 
a larger network and have built a higher level of trust to other negotiators, which al-
lows them to also benefit from their experiences. They however act less as learners 
themselves (as there is little new for them to learn in terms of negotiation tactics) than 
as ‘teachers’ (Bomberg, 2007) by supporting more junior negotiators to benefit from 
their experience (Interview 1, 4, 5, 10, 12). Senior negotiators’ previous experiential 
learning over several years of UNFCCC negotiation also enables them to act as policy 
entrepreneurs (Mintrom, 2013; Mintrom & Norman, 2009) by taking on leadership 
roles, actively promoting their proposals and convincing other actors of its importance 
and feasibility by repeating arguments, emphasizing facts and positive outcomes of 
impact assessments or scientific studies and using their personal capabilities (Braun, 
2009). These activities of individual policy entrepreneurs can result in convincing oth-
er actors in their own delegations and especially across negotiation groups of the im-
portance to support their proposals. Thus, policy entrepreneurs are central to transfer 
their individual learning to the organizational level.  
 Two experiential learning instances were particularly influential on the road to 
the Paris Agreement. The COP-15 climate negotiations in Copenhagen were widely 
regarded as a failure to arrive at the needed global new agreement to effectively ad-
dress climate change, resulting in a fragmentation of the climate change regime and 
putting the future of the climate negotiations in jeopardy (Christoff, 2017). Reflections 
on this ‘failure’ resulted in a number of individual and experiential learning processes. 
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The President of COP-15 Connie Hedegaard was appointed European Commissioner 
on Climate Action from 2010-2014. During her tenure as Commissioner, she used pol-
icy entrepreneurial strategies to convince her counterparts and achieve her negotiation 
objectives. Previous colleagues described her as “a very strong person, with her own 
views and a lot of self-confidence, as most politicians have (…) hard-working and very 
energetic, so quite remarkable” (Interview 12). This dedication was linked to her re-
flection on her experience as COP-15 President and strong drive to still achieve a 
meaningful climate agreement, having “a bit to prove now, because [COP-15] was 
considered a failure and then she was appointed Climate Commissioner, so she can’t 
really afford to fail again. I think she has an extra motivation, working very hard where 
she is now” (Interview 12). Subsequently, she played a central role in brokering an 
agreement with the developing countries, especially India, to negotiate some kind of 
comprehensive climate agreement of legal character under the Durban Platform for en-
hanced Action (Rajamani, 2012), which ultimately resulted in the Paris Agreement. 
The ‘side payment’ was to extend the expiring Kyoto Protocol to include a second 
commitment phase from 2012 until the new agreement would enter into force in 2020, 
although this de-facto meant unilateral EU commitments to reduce emissions (Inter-
views 4, 9, 15).  
The second major aspect of experiential learning that influenced the negotiation 
outcome was the reflection of the UNFCCC secretariat, especially of the Executive 
Secretary, as well as the COP-16, COP-17, COP-18, COP-19, COP-20 and especially 
COP-21 Presidencies on their previous negotiation experiences and the COP-15 nego-
tiations. They concluded that the negotiation process requires a different leadership ap-
proach with regards to a high level of transparency to ‘take every country along’ (In-
terview 2) and give the negotiations the level of legitimacy required to avoid that indi-
vidual countries object to the draft agreements. They emphasized a ‘common landing 
zone’ and focused on town hall-type meetings that listened to every negotiator’s con-
cerns and at the same time established rules encouraging constructive and innovative 
suggestions on moving towards common ground as opposed to simply voicing objec-
tions. These informal negotiation formats of ‘Indabas’ were introduced by the South 
African Presidency in Durban in 2011 and continued to be used by the French Presi-
dency into the hours leading up to the Paris Agreement (Nhamo and Nhamo, 2016). 
They also paired ministers from developed and developing countries to work through 
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the most controversial issues together, a tactic used successfully at the Cancun 2010 
negotiations (Monheim, 2014). Furthermore, the French Presidency reflected on the 
tactical errors made during the Copenhagen COP-15 negotiations, in particular the loss 
of trust among the majority of countries excluded from the closed door negotiations 
among the major greenhouse gas emitters who were accused of “drawing up a ‘secret 
text’” (Morales, 2015). Subsequently, the focus at COP-21 was on emphasizing the in-
clusiveness of the process and that “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed” (In-
terview 10), as well as adapting the strategic management of the negotiations to take 
into account developing countries’ concerns (Morales, 2015). These measures illustrate 
how individuals reflected on their own and other’s experiences with previous UN-
FCCC negotiations and drew lessons on what worked and did not work. This also re-
sulted in experiential learning on the organizational level as governments and the UN-
FCCC secretariat as a whole reflected on these experiences and changed their ap-
proaches and strategies with regards to managing the process of the negotiations 
(Monheim, 2014). 
 
 
Constructivist learning  
 
If individuals and countries change their underlying beliefs regarding an issue follow-
ing a reflection on a knowledge or experience-based input, they engage in constructiv-
ist learning. This learning type can be regarded as relatively rare and particularly useful 
in achieving negotiation breakthroughs as well as lasting policy change at the imple-
mentation stage on the national level. It can be ‘self-perpetuating’ given that the indi-
vidual, organization or country changed the way they ‘see things’ and in the future use 
their adapted beliefs as compass guiding their actions and decisions. In the UNFCCC 
negotiations between 2011 and 2015, remarkable constructivist learning occurred es-
pecially among developing country negotiators and, by extension, within their gov-
ernments and countries. As illustrated in the section on factual learning, both devel-
oped and developing countries alike began to present their low carbon economic de-
velopment plans and climate change policies in side events, at roundtables and increas-
ingly within the formal UNFCCC negotiations. This resulted in institutionalized days 
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of exchanging best practices and showcasing lessons learned from developing and im-
plementing climate policies (UNFCCC, 2018). The UNFCCC thus evolved into a 
‘learning forum’ with various platforms and initiatives aimed at policy transfer, policy 
diffusion, lesson drawing and showcasing best practices (Rietig, 2014). This group 
pressure put increasing pressure on ‘laggard’ countries to explore how they can set up 
low carbon economic development plans themselves and how they can pick ‘low hang-
ing fruits’ in the areas of energy efficiency and renewable energies (Interview 7, 10, 
11, 12). Especially renewable energies have dropped in price far enough to increase 
their competitiveness compared to fossil fuels, which provided new incentives for de-
veloping countries to consider shifting their infrastructure investment to integrate resil-
ience and low carbon objectives (Interview 8).  
 The constructivist learning on the organizational level is particularly illustrated 
in the shift in perspective among developing countries. Although they are exempted 
from greenhouse gas emission reductions under the Kyoto Protocol, they reflected on 
the benefits of setting up their own climate policies in support of low carbon economic 
development (Ivanova, 2016) and realizing other co-benefits such as reducing air and 
water pollution. This is evidenced by hundreds of pieces of climate change related pol-
icies and legislation set up in developing countries between 2008 and 2015 (Nachmany 
et al. 2014). The INDCs are a voluntary measure on the side of developing countries to 
shift to a low carbon trajectory in line with the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities. Individual negotiators convinced their governments, together with 
non-state actors, that there are ‘win-win’ opportunities in addressing climate change 
while realizing countries’ right to development. They formed this new belief and em-
braced it in their INDCs. This narrative marks a strong shift away from the dominant 
perspective within the UNFCCC negotiations that addressing climate change equals 
sacrificing economic growth and results in job losses. Countries instead began to em-
brace a positive narrative regarding shifts to a green economy, green growth and green 
jobs and understanding this shift as sources of new economic growth (Interview 1, 3, 4, 
7, 10, 14). 
Especially non-national actors played a pivotal role in facilitating constructivist 
learning by acting as policy entrepreneurs and ‘teachers’ (Bomberg, 2007). They “ef-
fectively identified the landing ground for the agreement, then encircled and squeezed 
the world’s governments until, by the end of the Paris conference, they were standing 
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on it” (Jacobs, 2016). The Global Commission on the Economy and Climate’s report 
generated significant momentum among parties. It picked up on the 2006 Stern Re-
view’s narrative on combining economic growth with climate action into ‘Better 
Growth, Better Climate’ (New Climate Economy, 2014) and was communicated by 
leading figures such as the former Mexican President Calderon at the 2014 Lima UN-
FCCC negotiations. Together with the 5th Assessment Report of the IPCC, the business 
community picked up on the positive narrative of co-benefits. It reflected on the feasi-
bility and forming new beliefs that the climate crisis can be addressed by viable in-
vestments in clean technologies and divesting their investments in the ‘stranded assets’ 
of fossil fuels to low carbon technologies (Jacobs, 2016). Inspired by the ‘We Mean 
Business’ coalition, 6.5 million businesses urged governments for climate action by 
December 2015. This was also a result of the environmental NGOs global campaign 
efforts against fossil fuel investments based on the Carbon Tracker’s concept on ‘un-
burnable carbon’ and global mass mobilization of 42 million supporters by activist 
NGOs such as Avaaz to put public pressure on governments (Jacobs, 2016). Public 
pressure from non-state actors on governments gained further momentum in the wake 
of the Climate Summit of September 2014 organized by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-
Moon, when cities and businesses made ambitious pledges, launched new initiatives 
(Hale, 2016) and over 400,000 members of civil society made headlines with their cli-
mate march (Jacobs, 2016; Interview 2). Overall, such policy entrepreneurial activities 
of non-national actors and their efforts at ‘teaching’ government delegates about the 
benefits of combining climate policies with economic development played a pivotal 
role in opening up the window of opportunity for the Paris Agreement to emerge. Their 
strategies of mobilization can be traced back to reflecting on their experiences leading 
up to the Copenhagen climate change conference, when their influence remained lim-
ited and far behind expectations. 
Timing played a very important role. In 2009, developing countries were not 
yet willing to commit to reducing their emissions, as they believed this would mean 
sacrificing development and inducing economic hardship on their populations. It also 
violated beliefs regarding climate justice aspects – and in particular feelings of being at 
the receiving end of further colonial-era injustices at the hands of the developed coun-
tries who industrialized by exploiting developing countries’ natural resources, burning 
fossil fuels and locking themselves into carbon-intensive infrastructures and lifestyles, 
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while at the same time denying developing countries their right to similar economic 
development pathways to address social injustices and invest in education, health and 
lift millions out of poverty via economic growth (Interview 4, 7). This belief only be-
gan to change gradually between 2010 and 2015 when it became clear that even if the 
developed countries stopped emitting greenhouse gases, the emissions from developing 
countries would still exacerbate climate change (Canete, 2015). Especially since China 
overtook the United States as the world’s largest emitter and the dire consequences of 
air and water pollution began to threaten political stability in China, the Chinese gov-
ernment reacted by enshrining the shift to a low carbon economy in their five-year 
plans. In 2009 renewable energies were also not yet a viable alternative to installing 
fossil fuels as their higher prices called for subsidies to support their uptake in domes-
tic energy markets. By 2015, the price of renewable energies dropped to a level that 
made them competitive with fossil fuels, including coal. The capacity to set up smart 
grids and manage the constant provision of electricity has also improved significantly 
(Covington, 2017). A number of key governments from China (Hilton and Kerr, 2017), 
the United States, Germany, the UK to India (Dubash, 2017; Walsh et al., 2011) bene-
fitted from dedicated leaders who acknowledged that climate change is a serious threat 
to their countries’ future economic prosperity and that acting upon it is in their national 
interest. This marked a crucial change in beliefs that allowed overcoming the negotia-
tion deadlock. This constructivist learning allowed the international community to 
make use of the ‘window of opportunity’ that was carefully orchestrated by policy en-
trepreneurs in December 2015.  
 
 
 
DISCUSSION ON THE RELEVANCE OF LEARNING FOR THE NEGOTIA-
TION OUTCOME 
 
The empirical section analyzed how learning among individuals and countries mattered 
and facilitated the negotiation outcome in the form of the Paris Agreement. This narra-
tive of learning as a facilitating factor for policy change sheds light on how negotiation 
deadlocks can be overcome in negotiations. Policy entrepreneurs learned from their 
past failures by reflecting on their experiences and changed their negotiation strategies. 
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A number of key individual and organizational policy entrepreneurs included the UN-
FCCC secretariat (in particular the Executive Secretary), the UN Secretariat (especially 
the UN Secretary General), Chairs and Rapporteurs of sub-committees, the Peruvian 
and French Foreign Ministers holding the COP-22 and COP-23 Presidencies, as well as 
a number of national government representatives and non-national actors (cities repre-
sented in C40 and the Covenant of Mayors, academics and NGO representatives). 
These individuals and organizations acted as policy entrepreneurs by going well be-
yond their job description and forming coalitions, carefully strategizing how the nego-
tiation deadlock might be overcome, passionately persuading other actors and forming 
strong coalitions (Mintrom, 2013). They made use of the ‘historical window of oppor-
tunity’ that presented itself to carefully orchestrate the negotiation outcome, while their 
negotiation strategies were based on previous experiential learning in the ten years 
leading up to the negotiations on the Paris Agreement. This enabled these policy entre-
preneurs to ‘teach’ other national government representatives of the importance to ad-
dress climate change and persuade them why it is in their interest to develop INDCs. 
The new, positive narrative around ‘low carbon economic development’ helped coun-
tries to overcome their decade-old opposition to climate policies, change their underly-
ing beliefs on the economic impacts of climate policies (from a win-lose to a win-win 
perspective focusing on the benefits of climate policies for low carbon economic de-
velopment) and to embrace INDCs to harvest the fruits of co-benefits from sustainable 
development. All three learning types were present in the examined case. Constructiv-
ist learning in the form of belief changes regarding the benefits of low carbon econom-
ic development policies occurred among developed and developing countries as a re-
sult of experiential learning and factual learning, both on the individual and on the or-
ganizational level. The experiential learning in the form of reflecting on national gov-
ernment’s positive experiences with low carbon technologies was highly relevant for 
the negotiation outcome to emerge. The experiential learning by the UNFCCC secre-
tariat and national government representatives involved in managing the negotiations 
(e.g. Presidencies, Committee Chairs) was also crucial. They reflected on how they 
could more effectively guide the negotiations towards the ‘common landing zone’ and 
subsequently emphasized the importance of transparency and inclusiveness to increase 
legitimacy – two key elements that were identified as lacking in the failed COP-15 ne-
gotiations in Copenhagen. Table 2 summarizes the empirical findings. 
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 Other           
explanations 
than learning 
Factual 
learning  
Experiential 
learning  
Constructivist learning  
Indi- 
vidual 
level 
Limited and/or 
linked to learn-
ing 
Individuals 
reflected on 
scientific evi-
dence on cli-
mate change, 
recognition 
and diffusion 
of national 
climate legis-
lation 
Key individu-
als reflected 
on their expe-
riences (suc-
cesses and 
failures) and 
became high-
ly involved 
policy entre-
preneurs  
Group pressure from other 
countries’ climate policies and 
low carbon development plans 
results in competition for more 
ambitious climate action follow-
ing individuals’ reflection on the 
compatibility of climate action 
and economic development, 
conclusion that climate action is 
in the interest of developing 
countries  
Or-
ganiza-
tional 
level 
Influence of 
non-national 
actors, which 
however facili-
tated learning 
among national 
actors and 
helped chang-
ing their beliefs 
on the compat-
ibility of cli-
mate action and 
economic de-
velopment 
Urgency of 
climate crisis 
communicat-
ed by 5th 
IPCC report 
Reflection on 
‘failures’ of 
COP-15, sub-
sequent em-
phasis on in-
clusive and 
transparent 
negotiation 
process 
Change in beliefs regarding 
compatibility of climate action 
and economic development, fo-
cus on long-term low carbon 
development architecture, 
emerging win-win perspective 
on combining climate action 
with economic prosperity; de-
veloping countries like China, 
India and Brazil acknowledge 
their responsibility to shift to 
low carbon economic develop-
ment pathways 
Table 2. Summary of key findings on learning types present within UNFCCC negotia-
tions. Compiled by author. 
 
The central finding of this article is not only that learning mattered; but also 
that learning was an important multiplying factor that facilitated and reinforced the 
positive effect of policy entrepreneurial activities of national governments and non-
national actors for resolving the negotiation deadlock. Not one factor alone explains 
why it was possible to overcome the decade old negotiation deadlock in the UNFCCC 
and to arrive at the comprehensive climate agreement the world failed to secure in 
2009, but learning is one of the central analytical lenses that helps to gain a more in-
depth understanding of the interactions of different negotiation dynamics at play. The 
theoretical framework (Rietig & Perkins, 2018) succeeded in providing an analytical 
lens to identify and evaluate the relevance of learning in an international negotiation 
process. Drawing on Janis and Mann (1977) and Mintrom (2013), it identifies policy 
entrepreneurs as key agents in transferring learning from the individual level to the or-
ganizational level of e.g. a national government’s official negotiation position. Based 
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on the contributions made by Radaelli (1995), Argyris and Schön (1978), March and 
Olsen (1975) the framework uses the knowledge and experience ‘archetypes’ of learn-
ing to increase analytical precision compared to the partly overlapping learning labels 
that emerged in the 1990s/2000s (Bennett and Howlett 1992; May 1992; Zito and 
Schout 2009). Especially drawing on the International Relations literature (Haas and 
Haas, 1995; Nye, 1987) allowed to dissect how beliefs on the individual and organiza-
tional level changed with regards to the benefits of climate action for economic devel-
opment. The aspects of learning identified with this framework point towards the fa-
cilitating role of learning in arriving at policy change in the form of overcoming the 
negotiation deadlock and adopting the Paris Agreement. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In conclusion, it could be argued that the world was not yet ready for a climate agree-
ment in 2009, but without the failure of 2009 and the lessons learned from this experi-
ence, the 2015 triumph would not have been possible. This contribution offered in-
sights into the relevance of learning from failure and how policy entrepreneurial activi-
ties of national governments and non-national actors helped to change beliefs on na-
tional interests with regards to the co-benefits of climate policies for economic devel-
opment. Learning facilitated achieving the breakthrough in the UNFCCC negotiations 
to arrive at the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. 
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